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SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOR PREVENTION OF HEAVY DISASTERS ON THE PLANT.
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Man-made disasters cost the most in terms of human suffering, loss of life and long-term damage to a country's economy and productive capacity. The last decade has seen a marked increase in what are known as "complex emergencies" - complex because war and internal conflict lead to the breakdown and collapse of social, political and economic structures. Sometimes these emergencies are accompanied by natural disasters, which compound their complexity. Inevitably agriculture and food production are major casualties.
Safety assessment is the systematic process that is carried out throughout the design process to ensure that all the relevant safety requirements are met by the proposed design of the plant. This would include also the requirements set by the operating organization and the regulators. Safety assessment includes, but is not limited to, the formal safety analysis. The design and the safety assessment are part of the same iterative process conducted by the plant designer which continues until a design solution which meets all the safety requirements, which may also include those developed during the course of the design, has been reached.
The safety analysis should assess the performance of the plant against a broad range of operating conditions, disasters (many of which may never be observed in actual plant operation), in order to obtain a complete understanding of how the plant is expected to perform in these situations. The safety analysis should also demonstrate that the plant can be kept within the safe operating regimes established by the designer.
The safety analysis should formally assess the performance of the plant under various operational and accident conditions, against goals or criteria for safety as may have been established by the operating organization, the regulatory body, or other national or international authorities, as applicable to the plant.
The safety analysis should identify potential weaknesses in the design, evaluate 
proposed design improvements and provide a demonstration that safety requirements are met and the risk from the plant is acceptably low. This should involve a comparison with risk criteria where they have been defined.
The safety analysis should assess whether:
-	Sufficient defence in depth has been provided and the levels of defence are preserved in that potential accident sequences are arrested as early as possible.
-	The plant can withstand the physical and environmental conditions it would experience. This would include extremes of environmental and other
-	conditions.
-	Human factors and human performance issues have been adequately addressed.
-	Long term ageing mechanisms that could detract from the plant’s reliability over the plant life are identified, monitored and managed (i.e. by upgrade, refurbishment or replacement) so that safety is not affected and risk does not increase.
The safety analysis process should be highly credible, with sufficient scope, quality, completeness and accuracy to engender the confidence of the designer, the regulator, the operating organization and the public in the safety of a plant’s design.
The results of the safety analysis will ensure with a high level of confidence that the plant will perform as designed and that it will meet all design acceptance criteria at commissioning and over the life of the plant.
The achievement of a high level of safety should be demonstrated primarily in a deterministic way. However, the safety analysis should incorporate both deterministic and probabilistic approaches. These approaches have been shown to complement each other and both should be used in the decision making process on the safety and ability of the plant to be licensed. The probabilistic approach provides insights into plant performance, defence in depth and risk that are not available in the deterministic approach. Probabilistic safety analysis provides a comprehensive, structured approach to identifying accident scenarios and deriving numerical estimates of risks.
The safety analysis should establish the conditions and limitations for safe
operation. This would include items such as:
-	Safety limits and control and other engineered safety systems,
-	Operational limits and reference settings for the control system,
-	Procedural constraints for operational control of processes,
-	Identification of the allowable operating configurations.
The safety analysis should aim to quantify a plant safety margin and demonstrate that a degree of defence in depth is provided for this class of accidents. This would include such measures where reasonably achievable:
-	To prevent the escalation of events into severe accidents, control the progression of severe accidents and limit the releases of radioactive material through the provision of additional equipment and accident management procedures.
-	To mitigate the radiological consequences that might occur through the
-	Provision of plans for on-site and off-site emergency response.
The results of the severe accident analysis should be used to identify source terms which could be used as a basis for off-site emergency planning.


